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Comparing Risks Thoughtfully
Adam M. Finkel*
For very good reasons, comparing risk is becoming all the rage, but
the practice of comparative risk assessment (CRA) has caused battle
lines to be drawn. I believe that CRA is neither as pernicious as its
detractors claim nor nearly as useful as its proponents allege -
particularly as is often practiced. At a time when agencies are being
required to set risk-based priorities and to compare might-be-regulated
risks to others with which the public is familiar,1 I argue that we need
better tools for showing when (if ever) such comparisons are edifying.
This article aspires to be an example of what risk assessment
practitioners have to offer, if and when the "risk wars" cool down
enough to allow a sensible alternative either to no analysis or to runaway
analysis as an end in itself.
Based on an appendix to one of the last reports to be released by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),2 this paper
has been revised to address broadly why CRA is controversial and to
offer suggestions for improving it.
Thesis
Comparing risks is not impossible or immoral, but it is very
difficult 3 - more so than either supporters or detractors of the
practice seem to realize. Whenever analysts, agencies or interested
parties decide to juxtapose different hazards and compare their
severity, they invite controversy. Many stakeholders view CRA with
* Dr. Finkel is Director, Health Standards Programs, U.S. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration. He received his A.B. (biology) from Harvard College, an
M.P.P. from the John F. Kennedy School of Government and a Sc.D. (Environmental
Health Sciences) from the Harvard School of Public Health. The views expressed here
do not necessarily reflect those of OSHA, OTA or Resources for the Future - where
he was a Fellow (Center for Risk Management) during initial writing.
1 See, e.g., Dalton G. Paxman, Congressional Risk Proposals, 6 Risk 165, 179
(1995).
2 Risks to Students in School (1995).
3 See also, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 Risk 191 (1995).
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suspicion because it may usurp fundamentally political choices with the
authority of "science" or appear to answer questions it cannot reliably
resolve. I too take a skeptical view but reject blanket condemnation that
has been partly responsible for dissuading researchers from doing
studies such as the OTA report this article originally supplemented.
It would be simple, and perhaps sufficient, to conclude that CRA is
inevitable and should therefore be done explicitly - and with broad
participation from experts and laypeople. I say "inevitable" because,
after taking a close look at the various purposes to which risk assessment
is put, it seems that virtually all risk assessment is CRA. Standard-
setting, the major arena of risk assessment, in fact often entails a risk
comparison - that of the existing risk to the reduced risk expected
following the contemplated intervention (which may be different in
kind or affect a different population). The incessant decisions to focus
on some risks and ignore or defer others also involve risk comparison,
whether the priorities thus obtained arise via conscious design or by
reflex. Even the language of risk communication involves comparison,
for few if any of us can really understand the magnitude of a risk of
"one in X" or "10-Y " in the abstract without making conscious or
subconscious comparison to other risks or situations - to ground these
probabilities to an experiential reference point, e.g., an annual. risk of
one in 1,000,000 is less likely than being struck by lightning, but more
likely than being struck by a meteorite.
CRA is more than a "necessary evil;" it is the logical extension of
the less formal thought processes individuals and governments rely
upon to help them make choices in all areas. Whenever a decision to -
or not to - act has consequences, in most cases more information
about the nature and extent of those consequences will make for a
better decision. Hamlet's observation that "there is nothing either good
nor bad, but thinking makes it so" 4 applies to the two major
components of CRA: Thinking about what advantages and
disadvantages (or "costs and benefits," if you will) that different
situations will bring about, and then thinking about how desirable or
undesirable these consequences are. The former process tends to be
more descriptive than normative, and the latter more a matter of values
4 Act II, ii, 259.
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than of analysis, but together they comprise what the late Bart Giamatti
called "the edifice of belief' that provides the basis for enabling us "to
cope with the vast population of decisions we all live in. '"5
Just because an activity like CRA can be both inevitable and
beneficial in theory, however, does not mean that it will do more good
than harm in practice. The history of CRA has certainly been marked
by strident - and well-founded - criticism of its products. Among
many observers, especially those who tend to favor strong
environmental, health and safety regulation, CRA has achieved
notoriety as an instrument for public confusion and disguising value
judgments with scientific veneer. This article will examine whether such
criticisms are valid and, more importantly, try to make the case that the
problems with CRA are not inherent in the method - but are the fault
of the methodology of its practitioners and can be remedied. To
borrow from Shakespeare again, "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our
stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings." 6
The lion's share of this article will discuss two major pitfalls of CRA
- one commonly cited by opponents and supporters alike, and one
routinely ignored. I then will sketch out a framework for improving
CRA to help ameliorate these problems. To foreshadow where this
argument is headed, I will use the metaphor of "the keys and the
lamppost," and suggest that at present, CRA is an excellent method for
finding our lost keys if in fact they lie within the circle of light cast by
the lamppost. If the answer is not there, we need to improve CRA to
illuminate a broader area.
When and How CRA is Currently Undertaken
Risk comparisons are ubiquitous in the daily lives of individuals and
societies. Planning for the national defense, for example, is a constant
endeavor of assessing and comparing threats of disparate types in arenas
all over the world, and allocating finite resources to minimize the
chance that we will be unable to respond quickly to a serious hazard.
Similarly, U.S. states (notably Oregon) and those abroad, who are
wrestling with the inability to provide high-technology medical
5 A. Bartlett Giamatti, A Free and Ordered Space: The Real World of the
University (1988).
6 Julius Caesar, Act I, ii, 134
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interventions to all their citizens, have had to compare the costs and
efficacies of hundreds of procedures and therapies to determine which
should be universally available.
In the more germane area of environmental CRA, I have found it
useful to distinguish between two different kinds of comparative
activities that differ in motivation as well as in methodology. For want
of a better pair of descriptions, these can be called the "small" and
"large" versions of CRA. "Small" CRA involves the quantitative side-
by-side comparison of single risks. Ten or fifteen years ago, the most
well-known (actually, notorious) examples of "small" CRA were the
juxtaposition of markedly dissimilar risks, often with one of the pair
voluntary and the other the result of involuntary exposure. Such "hang-
gliding is riskier than benzene" 7 comparisons fell into disrepute
because they were seen by many as manipulative and grounded in
numerical sleight-of-hand rather than in a neutral desire to inform and
help put risks in perspective. 8 Still, the "didactic" type of CRA where
disparate risks are compared has never fallen completely out of favor
and may in fact be making a comeback. As recently as April 1994, a
televised documentary 9 used as its centerpiece a table of risks
purporting to show, among other things, that smoking cigarettes takes
several years off the life of the average person while exposure to
pesticide residues only reduces life expectancy by 27 days on average.
Table 1 presents various different examples of "small" risk comparisons,
arranged in a rough and highly subjective ordering beginning with the
least useful varieties.10
7 Bernard Cohen & I-Sing Lee, A Catalog of Risks, 36 Health Phys. 707 (1979).
8 Rothschild's Numerate Arrogance, 276 Nature 429 (1978) (Editorial, calling
such comparisons "the kindergarten of risk").
9 ABC News, April 21, 1994, Are We Scaring Ourselves to Death?
10 The purpose of this table is to show the wide variety of types of risk comparisons;
the ordering should certainly not be construed as challenging the validity of any
ordering previously proposed.
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Table 1
Different Kinds of "Small" Risk Comparisons
(in one possible ascending order of legitimacy)
* Incongruous, unrelated, mischaracterized risks: "More people died in
(some notorious event) than died at Three Mile Island"
- Unrelated risks, but ones a person might conceivably choose among:
"Working at an oil refinery is safer than hang-gliding"
; Related risks from different sources: "The cancer risk of eating one
peanut butter sandwich (containing 2 ppb aflatoxin) is larger than that of
drinking a glass of water containing one ppb chloroform"
• Synonymous risks from different sources: "You are exposed to more
benzo[a]pyrene from a pound of char-broiled steak than you are living
for a year next to Acme Industries"
- Various risks competing for some of the same financial and human
resources: "The 'Valley of the Barrels' site has the 24th highest score on
the list of Superfund sites; the 'Sinatra Swamp' is #424 and is thus of
much lower priority"
- Existing risk versus its substitute: "More people would get lung cancer
if cars burned MTBE than if they continued to burn gasoline"
- Countervailing effects of the same intervention: "Making cars out of
high-tech plastic would cause X fewer cancers from oil-industry and
steel-industry emissions, but Y more people would die in highway
crashes due to less crashworthy autos"
"Large" CRA is a more recent phenomenon. It involves the
comparison of categories of risks and is increasingly being undertaken,
both for symbolic and practical purposes, as a national consensus begins
to grow that as a society we focus too much attention on certain
"lower-risk" categories while failing to address other higher-risk
categories. The most prominent examples of "large" CRA have come
from EPA. Reports in 198711 and 199012 both tried to show that if
we would set our priorities with a more "rational" risk-based mindset,
we could save more lives and provide greater ecological protection
without increasing our total environmental budget. For example,
perhaps the single most commonly-cited "irrationality" is the disparity
between the several billion dollars we spend annually to clean up
11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative
Assessment of Environmental Problems (1987).
12 Science Advisory Board, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Reducing Risk:
Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection (1990).
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abandoned hazardous waste sites, which EPA estimates in total
probably to cause no more than several hundred excess cancer deaths
per year, versus the $100 million (at most) we spend controlling radon
gas in buildings, which may cause as many as 20,000 excess cancers
annually. According to these figures, we might be able to save lives
some 20,000 times more efficiently (on a cost-per-life-saved basis) by
transferring dollars from site cleanup to radon mitigation. "Large"
CRA has not yet made a substantial impact in the way resources are
actually allocated, but the continued prominence of these sorts of
comparisons in the mass media may well lead to a "quiet revolution" in
our national environmental protection system over the next decade. 13
Indeed, CRA's influence may eventually extend even wider, as
momentum seems to be building for comparing environmental
"unfinished business" with unaddressed risks elsewhere in society,
perhaps with the end result that we will avail ourselves of other risk
reductions (e.g., the provision of smoke detectors in all public housing
units or the expansion of prenatal clinics) with resources freed up by the
rollback of some environmental programs.14
Having addressed the issue of when CRA is performed, it is a bit
easier to summarize how it is usually carried out. The overwhelming
tendency uniting all of the types of comparisons in Table 1 (as well as
many other kinds of "small," and most "large," risk comparisons made
between federal risk-reduction programs) is the circumscribed nature of
the analysis. Risks differ in many ways, whether they are as unrelated as
hang-gliding and benzene exposure are, or as seemingly synonymous as
lead in paint versus lead in gasoline. Yet, CRA has become a classic
exercise in turning on the proverbial lamppost to illuminate a small
(though doubtless important) portion of the entire tableau. What we
call "risk comparison" is generally little more than 'fatality
comparison" - from all the ways in which two hazards differ, we
report the total number of deaths each may cause as if that were the
only factor distinguishing them. 15
13 Adam M. Finkel, Taking Aim at Environmental Risks: Questions of Feasibility
and Desirability, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, July 1992, at 46.
14 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (1993), but see Adam M.
Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 NYU Env'l L.J. 295 (1995).
15 To be fair, CRA practitioners sometimes compare individual risk levels rather
Finkel: Comparing Risks Thoughtfully 331
Actually, the current state of affairs is a bit worse. More influential
"risk comparisons" are in fact based on a single quantifiable attribute of
the things being compared, but one that may have nothing to do with
risk! For example, many critics of our national effort to control
synthetic pesticides ritually invoke the statement made by Bruce Ames
that "99.99% (by weight) of all the pesticides in our diet are naturally-
occurring."16 Even if this statistic itself was uncontoversial (which it
isn't), it is not a statement about risk, but instead about the relative
weight of the added versus endogenous chemicals; only if the
carcinogenic potency (per unit of mass) of the two classes was exactly or
nearly equal would "99.99% all-natural" be relevant to risk. Similarly,
statements such as "a person whose [daily] diet consisted of nothing but
four and a half pounds of applesauce... would ingest in one year an
amount of UDMH equal in weight to the tar inhaled by smoking two
filtered cigarettes" 17 were influential in the public controversy and
private litigation surrounding Alar. However, because it also ignores the
crucial variable of biologic potency, this weight-weight comparison is
about as scientific (and not as candid) as telling someone that the
amount of salt he is putting on his potato would be enough to wipe out
a city - if it happened to be plutonium instead of salt!
The remainder of this article will deal largely with the question of
why such "one-dimensional" comparisons - assuming the one
dimension compared is at least a measure of risk - are a poor
foundation for risk communication, decision-making and priority-
setting. To make this point, I need to convince the reader of two
assertions: (1) There are other legitimate ways to measure the
consequences of a hazardous exposure or activity beyond simply the
expected number of fatalities; and (2) quantifiable consequences alone
are only one of the legitimate lenses through which to view threats to
health, safety and the environment.
than population consequence figures. However, in many cases little new information is
revealedby adding this dimension; it often simply represents the population-wide
consequence divided by the estimated number of persons exposed to each risk, i.e.,
the average individual risk.
16 Bruce N. Ames, Margie Profet, & Lois S. Gold, Dietary Pesticides (99.99% All
Natural), 87 Proc. National Acad. Sci. 7777 (1990).
17 Joseph D. Rosen, Much Ado About Alar, Issues in Science and Technology, Fall
1990, at 85.
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The Irony of Risk Comparisons
Before turning to ways to improve CRA, it must be acknowledged
that improvement may be futile because of the widespread
preconception that no method can compare disparate risks sensibly.
The politics of CRA have remained stable for a number of years: The
"camp" of proponents (consisting largely of academics, industry
representatives and some government officials) believes CRA is an
underutilized tool that could help us make better decisions, while the
"camp" of detractors (consisting largely of environmental advocates
and members of the public-at-large) is profoundly suspicious of CRA
and believes it cannot be performed thoughtfully enough to overcome
its inherent disadvantages. The former group is generally satisfied with
existing methodology for comparing risks. It stands to reason that
those who believe straightforward comparisons of the likely magnitude
of different risks are informative would want the comparison process
itself to be simple and standardized. Members of the latter group
appear to be primarily concerned about the tendency of CRA to
oversimplify and mislead the public by reporting subjective opinion
about the relative importance of risks as if it were an wholly objective,
empirical observation. Since practitioners of CRA have not made any
great strides in addressing this problem, the skeptics' belief is
understandable. Because of the nature of this political landscape, there
currently is little if any clamor for reforming CRA methodology; the
debate tends to be polarized between those who want CRA expanded
and those who argue that CRA should be scrapped.
The intensity of the opposition to CRA is actually quite ironic. The
feature of CRA that arouses the most criticism at present is in my view
not serious, whereas other attributes of current CRA methodology that
actually make it more precarious receive little or no attention. Thus, to
return to the thesis of this article, critics of CRA may be right - but
for the wrong reasons.
By far the most commonly-criticized attribute of CRA is its
reliance on juxtaposing situations that allegedly are incommensurable.
Opposition to CRA often begins and ends with the put-down that "you
can't compare apples and oranges," as if that accusation was so serious
that nothing else about CRA mattered. But the impotence of this
accusation is reasonably easy to document. The maxim about apples
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and oranges is a truism, as opposed to a truth, because it is not generally
valid either literally or metaphorically. 18
Table 2
How to Compare Apples and Oranges





* Vitamin C content?
" Vitamin K content?
Step II: Normative Valuation (Gauging Preferences for Each Attribute)
" "More is better" (e.g., taste)
" "More is worse" (e.g., price)
" Inter-individual variation in preferences over the same attribute
" ("Ultra Slim-Fast" and "Quick Weight Gain" both sell)
Step III: Descriptive Valuation (Assessing Each Option and Attribute)
* Which is cheaper?
" Which tastes better?
" Which must be peeled/which washed?
" How do you feel about the Florida Citrus Commission
* (national spokespersons; Anita Bryant, Rush Limbaugh)?
Step IV: Aggregation (Combining Pros and Cons for Each Attribute)
Comparison Example
Attribute Apple (A) Orange(O) Importance "Subtotal"
Taste ++ + 5 A
Price $0.79 $0.69 4 0
Calories 60 kcal 70 kcal 3 A
Convenience + + 2 A
Politics 0 - 1 A
Rough multiplication and summation of the third and fourth columns gives
1 1A, 40; buy the apple!
Even if the scores for one dimension (say, calories) were too uncertain to assign a
definite preference to A, the total score would still be 8A, 40.
Millions of times each day, consumers at their local supermarket
assuredly do compare apples and oranges, just as we all do in a less
literal sense when making myriad other choices. We compare highly
dissimilar states such as marrying or remaining single, going to law or
business school, or buying a small house in a safe neighborhood or a
larger one in a less safe neighborhood, by a conceptually simple
18 Other truisms, such as "a watched pot never boils," may have real value if not
taken literally but are still not literally true. (Your gaze cannot affect the transfer of
heat from the burner to the water.)
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cognitive process. As Table 2 shows, when we choose between two
commodities, risks or life prospects, we really perform a mental exercise
that involves breaking each option down into its component attributes,
making a set of descriptive judgments (How much of each attribute
does each situation embody?) followed by corresponding normative
judgments (How much do I value each attribute?), and then
reconstituting each option by combining the pros and cons contributed
by each judgment. So, if we have to choose between an exciting but
unreliable life partner and a dull but sturdy one, we can. This implies
that we can discriminate between apples and oranges or between
smoking and living near a coke oven at least as readily.
Table 3
Ranking Risk Comparisons 19
First-rank risk comparisons
1. Comparisons of the same risk at different times.
2. Comparisons with a standard.
3. Comparisons with different estimates of the same risk.
Second-rank risk comparisons (less desirable)
4. Comparisons of the risk of doing and not doing something.
5. Comparisons of alternative solutions to the same problem.
6. Comparisons with the same risk experienced at other places.
Third-rank risk comparisons (even less desirable)
7. Comparisons of average risk with peak risk at a particular time or
place.
8. Comparisons of the risk from one source of a particular adverse
effect with the risk from all sources of that same adverse effect.
Fourth-rank risk comparisons (marginally acceptable)
9. Comparisons of risk with cost, or of cost/risk ratio with cost/risk
ratio.
10. Comparisons of risk with benefits.
11. Comparisons of occupational with environmental risks.
12. Comparisons with other risks from the same source, such as the
same facility of the same risk agents.
13. Comparisons with other specific causes of the same disease,
illness or injury.
Fifih-rank risk comparisons (rarely acceptable - use extreme caution)
14. Comparisons of unrelated risks.
19 Table adapted from Roth et al., What Do We Know about Making Risk
Comparisons? 10 Risk Anal. 375, 376 (1990) - based in turn on Vincent T.
Covello, Peter M. Sandman & Paul Slovic, Risk Communication, Risk Statistics and
Risk Comparisons: A Manual of Plant Managers (Chemical Mfrs. Assn. 1988).
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That disparate circumstances are commensurable when push comes
to shove may explain some of the most provocative new empirical
research about how laypeople actually regard various types of risk
comparisons. Recently, when two groups of researchers empirically
tested the most widely-accepted predictions about how laypeople were
supposed to react to various kinds of risk comparisons, responses either
did not support or flatly contradicted the thesis that the more
dissimilar the comparison, the less acceptable and more aggravating the
recipients would find it.2 0 Table 3 represents an initial ranking by
Covello et al. based on limited experience.
For example, those surveyed by the Roth group generally regarded
a hypothetical comparison of two estimates of the same pollutant risk (a
type of comparison estimated as very acceptable) as less reassuring,
informative and trust-engendering than a comparison of the pollutant
risk with the risk of lightning, hurricanes and insect bites (estimated as
"fifth rank" or "rarely acceptable"). 2 1
The first giant step towards reforming CRA, therefore, is to
recognize that the problem is how risks differ, not merely that they
differ. In other words, apples and oranges are not interchangeable, but
neither are they totally alien - they are just different, and different in
ways we can make sense of and value for ourselves. The unmet
challenge of CRA is to describe disparate risks in rich, informative and
non-manipulative ways.
This conceptual challenge cannot be met, however, unless a
technical hurdle is overcome - the damaging tendency to compare
risks that are both uncertain and variable via misleading point estimates
of each risk. This is what I mean by "the irony of risk comparisons" -
the fact that critics of CRA focus on the incommensurability "problem"
while practitioners continue to deflect the more serious problem of
incorporating considerations of uncertainty and variability into risk
20 Roth et al., supra and Paul Slovic, Nancy Kraus & Vincent T. Covello,
Comment: What Should We Know About Making Risk Comparisons? 10 RiskAnal.
389 (1990).
21 1 do not presume here to judge which of the two papers cited supra in note 18
more correctly captures the public's view about the relative acceptability of various
types of risk comparisons. I only suggest that the emphasis of Slovic et al., supra note
20, on the dissimilarity of the things being compared may be a blind alley if in fact
the public recognizes the limited applicability of the "apples and oranges" maxim.
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comparison. 22 The next section, with Appendix A, briefly introduces
uncertainty and variability in risk estimation and comparison.
Uncertainty and Variability
Uncertainty and variability are both hard to define precisely and
hard to keep conceptually separate where appropriate, but both are
inextricably part of estimating the magnitude of risk, and even of
assessing many of the other less-quantitative attributes enumerated in
the following section. Brief definitional material may help. 23
a Uncertainty is a property of our ability to observe or
understand a system; it prevents us from knowing the "true
value" of some quantity because we cannot measure it
precisely, observe enough information to pin down its
behavior, or specify the underlying physical or biological
model that would allow us to predict its value given some
information. Variability is a property of the system itself; it
manifests itself as a multiplicity of "true values" because
quantities of interest change over time, across spatial areas or
among individual people.
SA pplied to a risk estimate, acknowledging uncertainty
would mean saying that "the risk to the average person is
somewhere between 1 0-A and 10-B; we cannot say for sure
which end of this range (or any value in between) is the true
value." 24 Acknowledging variability means saying that "we
know the risk to the average person is exactly 10-C, but
because people's exposures vary, we can only say that your
risk is somewhere between 10-D and 10-E."
22 A further irony is that, in the past several years, observers have begun to recognize
that individual risks cannot be properly characterized via point estimates. Yet, this
realization has not yet found its way into the debate about CRA even though it is
harder to compare uncertain risks than it is to make a reasonable attempt to address
an uncertain risk in isolation; Adam M. Finkel, Towards Less Misleading
Comparisons of Uncertain Risks: The Example of Alar and Aflatoxin, 103 Env'l
Health Persp. 376 (1995). This assertion flies in the face of much rhetoric about the
relative ease of comparing risks (allegedly, putting two or more risks on a relative
rather than an absolute scale sidesteps problems of modeling and scale), but a bit more
thought should illuminate the more important point that uncertainty compounds with
the number of items being compared. Mathematically, the uncertainty in the quotient
of two quantities is larger than the uncertainty in each item singly.
23 For an elaboration, see Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air
Pollutants, National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment,
Chs. 9-11 (1994).
24 Equivalently, that "the number of expected fatalities in a population of size P is
somewhere between P x 1 0 "A and P x 1 0 -B, not exactly one or the other."
Finkel: Comparing Risks Thoughtfully 337
• Since most risk estimates are both uncertain and
variable, the range of estimates that would account for both
factors will generally be broader than either range assessed
separately. For example, a risk assessor might summarize
both phenomena by saying "there is a 5% chance that your
risk is as high as X" (where X is related to the upper bound
given uncertainty on the estimate that applies to a person at
the upper end of the distribution of variability) "and a 5%
chance your risk is as low as Y."
* Uncertainty can be reduced through additional research
or data collection; variability cannot be reduced, only better
understood, through investigation of the relevant temporal,
spatial and inter-individual actors.
• However, both uncertainty and variability can be
"managed" by homing in on a single estimate from their
respective distributions. An uncertain risk can be
summarized via a central estimate, a lower bound or an
upper bound;25 this value judgment addresses the issue of
whether (and to what extent) to strive to be "safe rather than
sorry." A variable risk can be simplified by choosing to
address a portion of the population or set of
temporal/spatial conditions; this may result in value
judgments about "Who (or when or where) will be safe, and
who will be sorry?"
- When comparing risks, uncertainties or variabilities
sometimes cancel (e.g., inter-individual variability is not a
problem when assessing the relative risks of two hazards to
the same person) but sometimes reinforce each other (e.g., if
Risk A causes somewhere between ten and 100 deaths, and
Risk B between five and 50 deaths, the relative risk of A/B
may be as high as 20:1 or as low as 1:5 - assessing both
risks "conservatively" or via "best estimates" does not alter
the fact that either could be larger than the other).
Together, uncertainty and variability are arguably much more
serious than the "apple and orange" problem. If you know your choice
is between an apple and an orange, you can probably make a reasonable
choice even though you will get more of some desired dimensions and
less of others. Yet, if you can't measure or even reliably estimate, e.g.,
the price, calories or taste of the fruit, you can't choose between even
two apples with any assurance you will pick the "better" one.
Fortunately, when comparing risks the influence of uncertainty and
variability on the comparison can often be roughly quantified with only
25 See Appendix A.
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a marginal increase in the analytic effort needed to generate point
estimates of risk. Then, comparing risks thoughtfully simply requires
rephrasing the questions asked. For uncertain risks, the question
"Which risk is larger?" needs to be refined into "How confident can we
be as to which risk is larger, by how much (with what consequences if I
guess wrong)?" Appendix A summarizes procedures for asking this
latter question and shows some of the different decision problems that
result. For risks that vary spatially, temporally or inter-individually, the
question needs to be rephrased as "for whom (or when or where) is this
risk larger?" In the "groundlings" example discussed below, the answer
to this latter question might be "pesticide exposure is riskier than being
out-of-doors where an airplane might crash on you, unless you live
within X miles of an airport flight path." Similarly, Schwing and
Kamerud showed that the question "Is it safer to drive or to fly?"
depends in large part on the day of the week and the time of day you
plan to travel, as the individual fatality risks in automobiles vary across
the 168 hours in each week by a factor of 134.26
Basic Theorems of an Improved CRA
The raw materials for broadening the scope (hence public
acceptability) of CRA consist of a fuller enumeration of risk attributes.
The next section will present such a listing of "dimensions" by which
risks differ, including various ways to express the statistical magnitude
of risks as well as many other dimensions unrelated to magnitude.
However, a "laundry list" alone would be of little incremental value
without two other improvements: A conceptual framework for applying
the "multi-dimensional" mindset to actual risk comparisons, and a
social and institutional process by which such a framework could be
implemented. These topics will be treated in turn, as "bookends" on
either side of listing the dimensions themselves.
To move beyond the "ten deaths are more than nine deaths" kind
of one-dimensional comparisons that characterize the current state of
CRA, I propose three related theorems:
26 Richard C. Schwing & Dana B. Kamerud, The Distribution of Risks: Vehicle
Occupant Fatalities and Time of the Week, 8 RiskAnal. 127 (1988).
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* Theorem 1: Choices (the more general type of decision
problem) or risks (the type of problem relevant here) ideally
should be compared along all of the relevant dimensions
that differentiate them.
* Theorem 2: If some of these dimensions (in the limit,
all but one of them) are to be ignored for the sake of
simplicity, time or other constraints, the remaining
dimension(s) should be the most important one(s).
* Theorem 3: The importance of a dimension is in turn
a function of two factors: The absolute amount by which the
choices or risks differ with respect to this dimension (an
empirical question), and the relative influence of the
dimension on the decision (a value judgment).
To illustrate how these ideas apply in practice, let us consider two
stereotypical comparisons: The literal choice between an apple and an
orange, and the comparison between the risk of being killed by a
crashing airplane (while you are on the ground) and the risk of getting
cancer from pesticide residues on your food. In the apple/orange
comparison, if resources did not permit making the comparison along
all of the potentially relevant dimensions listed at the beginning of
Table 2, then Theorem 3 provides guidance as to which of many
possible simple comparisons are apt to be uninformative or misleading.
The first part of Theorem 3 cautions the analyst against focusing
the comparison on a single dimension where the absolute difference
between the two risks may be either statistically insignificant (i.e., the
"signal" that one risk surpasses the other along this dimension is smaller
than the "noise" that makes us unable to measure either risk precisely)
or functionally insignificant (i.e., the difference may be real and
definitive, but it is so small as to be of no practical importance).27 An
example of this kind of "tunnel vision" would be comparing apples and
oranges based solely on the assertion that apples were lower in calories
and therefore preferable, if in fact the average apple had 69 calories to
the orange's 70 (and even more so if inaccuracies in measurement or the
variation in calories among apples could outstrip this one-calorie across-
species average difference). The second half of Theorem 3 offers a
27 In The Prelude, bk. II, 1. 216-219, William Wordsworth was particularly critical
of over-reliance on
that false secondary power/By which we multiply distinctions,
then/Deem that our puny boundaries are things/That we perceive, and
not that we have made.
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different caution: Even if a difference is definitive and substantial, one
ought not to highlight a distinction that does not or should not
strongly influence the overall comparison. Suppose, for example, that
apples were markedly enriched in Vitamin K relative to oranges. It
would then be accurate, but manipulative, to advise someone to buy
apples solely on the basis of this real but probably irrelevant difference.
These two pitfalls seem obvious in the context of buying fruit, but
they are routinely ignored in comparing environmental, health and
safety risks. Consider the second example - that of the airline risk to
"groundlings" versus the cancer risk from some particular pesticide. It is
certainly possible to argue that in a given case, the former risk is worse
than the latter by virtue of a larger probability of fatality. John Graham
has testified to this effect before Congress on several occasions, 2 8
citing the empirical work of Goldstein et al. 2 9 According to these
experts, the average U.S. citizen faces a lifetime risk of about 5 x 10-6 of
being killed by being hit by a crashing airplane. Thus, a 1 x 10-6
lifetime excess risk standard applied to carcinogenic pesticides is
arguably irrational because it seeks to reduce risk to a level one fifth as
large as one perceived as remote and already "accepted" by society
(whose citizens seem to be unconcerned about being out of doors or in
unreinforced structures where an airplane might fall on them).
However, such a comparison conceivably violates both of the
precepts in Theorem 3. First, the difference between five per million
and one per million may be a "puny boundary" a la Wordsworth: We
are used to thinking of a factor of five as a significant difference, but
numbers on the order of 10-6 are not nearly so precise or directly
verifiable as the kinds of quantities that reinforce the belief that a five-
fold difference is large. More to the point, these average risks do not
reflect the substantial variation in risk that real people undergo; the
reason that most people probably think the risk of being hit by a falling
airplane is remotely low is that for most of us it is remotely low. That
28 John D. Graham, testimony before joint hearing of the House Subcomm. on
Health and Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce and the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Sept. 21, 1993; also The Role of Risk
Analysis in Environmental Protection, his testimony before the House Comm. on
Government Operations, Feb. 1, 1994.
29 Bernard D. Goldstein et al., Risk to Groundlings of Death Due to Airplane
Accidents: A Risk Communication Tool, 12 RiskAnal. 339 (1992).
Finkel: Comparing Risks Thoughtfully 341
average of 5 x 10-6 is probably a hybrid of two risks: A higher risk
among the small minority of people who live near airport flight paths
(and especially near airports, since the risk of a crash is greatest at
takeoff and landing), and a much lower risk among the majority of
us. 30 For most U.S. citizens, therefore, the one per million risk from
the hypothetical pesticide may in fact be larger than the risk of the
airplane crashing on them.
Even if the numerical distinction between the two types of risk were
definitive and applied across-the-board, the second pitfall in Theorem 3
might apply - that the numerical dimension was unimportant
compared to other unexamined dimensions. Being hit by an airplane
and contracting cancer from pesticides are both involuntary; the
ultimate consequences might be similar, but the risks differ in many
ways. The next section enumerates many of these; for now, consider the
single extra dimension of offsetting benefits. People may logically
regard having a national system of frequent airline flights as a benefit
making annual several deaths among "groundlings" acceptable, but they
may also feel that pesticide benefits do not justify a commensurate or
even a smaller number of excess deaths. I agree with Graham's
testimony that we should carefully consider the absolute benefits of a
pesticide before we vow to reduce or eliminate what may be its small
risks. Doing so, however, means that the relative comparison between
the benefits of airplane travel and pesticides may push the numerical
comparison of statistical risks to a subsidiary or even an irrelevant
position. In the language of Theorem 3, it may well be that the
dimension of concomitant benefits is both more significant and more
influential, i.e., more "important" than turning on the "lamppost" to
illuminate fatalities alone.
Enumerating the Dimensions of Risk
On the one hand, any list of the potentially important dimensions
by which risks may differ should be taken with a grain of salt, as it
necessarily reflects strongly the subjective personal views of the author.
30 For example, if 98% of the deaths to "groundlings" occur among the one million
people who live nearest to airports, their risk would be 1.2 x 10-3/lifetime, but the risk
to the remaining 249 million U.S. citizens would be 10-7, one tenth of the
hypothetical pesticide risk.
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On the other hand, it is unfortunate that few such lists have been
published to date,3 1 because only through comparing the idiosyncratic
views of different observers can we begin to synthesize and codify a list
of dimensions that citizens and policymakers could use in common.
In preparing the list that follows, I was guided by rules proposed by
Morgan et al.3 2 First, they advised that the dimensions (what they call
"attributes") listed should comprise a set that is: (1) comprehensive, (2)
non-redundant, (3) preferentially independent, i.e., a person's
judgment about the amount of a particular dimension for a given risk
should not depend upon amounts along other dimensions, (4)
measurable and (5) minimal in number, i.e., not needlessly detailed.
Moreover, they recommended that the attributes should be sorted into
a small number of categories and that such sorting should be guided by
a principle of correlation, i.e., for any given risk, people's judgments
about various attributes that fall within the same category should be
fairly well-correlated, whereas their judgments about other attributes
that cut across categories should be rather uncorrelated. 33
I have sorted my own conception of a "minimal set" of dimensions
into three categories: "magnitude," "dread" and "social context." Two
of these are very similar to the three groups of attributes Morgan et al.
developed. 3 4 However, within each category I list various dimensions
that do not appear in that typology - and vice versa.
Category L: Magnitude
* Unweighted population-based measures of magnitude. An
example is the number of excess fatalities (or cases of disease or injury)
per annum or per lifetime. This is by far the most prevalent way of
31 Although others have written about the "multidimensionality" of risk, they have
tended only to present highly aggregated combinations of dimensions, not the kind
of major and minor typology presented here. For example, the well-known "risk
mapping" pioneered by Slovic highlights only two dimensions of risk - albeit two
very inclusive ones - "degree to which the risk is known" and "dread." See Paul
Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987).
32 M. Granger Morgan et al., A Procedure for Ranking Risk within Federal
Agencies, in Comparing Environmental Risks: Tools for Setting Governmental
Piorities (. Clarence Davies, ed. 1995), at 111.
33 For example, in the literal apple/orange comparison modeled in Table 2, there
might be a category of aesthetic attributes that were closely correlated with each
other, but another category of economic attributes that each were not correlated with
any of the aesthetic judgments.
34 M. Granger Morgan et al., supra note 32.
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comparing risk magnitudes; it is so far the only measure EPA uses to
inform its "large" risk comparisons.
0 Weighted population-based measures that do not treat all fatalities
as equivalent. An example is the commonly-used "person-years of life
lost," which weights the death of an infant much more heavily than the
death of an octogenarian.
a Individual-risk measures independent of the number of persons at
risk. These measures are in units of probability, not of consequence
(e.g., the probability that an individual with average exposure will
contract cancer over a year or a lifetime). Generally, EPA and others try
to estimate the risk to a real or hypothetical individual whose exposure
(although not susceptibility) is above-average or "maximal". To
oversimplify, the population-based measures imply a "public health"
philosophy of risk management - that the worst risks affect the
greatest number of persons - while individual-risk measures imply a
"civil rights" philosophy - that the worst risks are those that subject
any persons to the highest probabilities of death or disease.3 5
* Hybrid measures that incorporate characteristics of both
population and individual risk criteria. Estimating the magnitude of
risk either by population-wide consequence alone or by maximum (or
average) individual risk alone necessarily discriminates against people
who live in either densely-populated or sparsely-populated areas. The
former type of measure regards a risk of 10" 6/person in a city of two
million as more serious than one of 10-2/person in a village of 100. So
the villagers might receive less protection even though their risk levels
was each 10,000 times higher than the urbanites' (i.e., two expected
fatalities in the city versus one in the village). On the other hand, if the
individual-risk criterion were used exclusively, urbanites would lose out
in the sense that their risks might have been reduced twice as efficiently
on a cost-per-life-saved basis than could the villagers' risks. Yet, such
discrimination based on population density does not have to occur. As
several others have pointed out,36 even a very simple hybrid measure
35 Adam M. Finkel, A Way Out of the "Individuals versus Populations" Dilemma
in Air Toxics Regulation, unpublished, Center for Risk Management, Resources for
the Future (1990).
36 Finkel supra and Paul Milvy, A General Guideline for Management of Risk
ftom Carcinogens, 6 RiskAnal. 69 (1986).
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such as the product of expected fatalities (D) and maximum individual
risk (Rmax) can help balance competing social goals. For example, a
goal of reducing (D x Rmax) to below 0.0001 would imply, each on the
borderline of "unacceptability," equivalence of. 100 persons, each facing
a lifetime risk of 10-3 (D 0.1, Rmax = 0.001) and one million, each
facing a risk of 10- 5 (D = 10, Rmax = 0.00001). 37 By weighting or
otherwise modifying this product, risk managers can strike any other
balance between desire for efficiency and aversion to inequality.
* Measures that incorporate the concept of "background. " Some
experts believe that society's evaluation of a particular excess risk should
not be made independently of pre-existing (and perhaps unavoidable)
sources of the same risk.3 8 By this reckoning, an incremental risk of
(say) 10"5/lifetime caused by disposal of uranium mill tailings would be
a higher priority in a community where there were no other sources of
exposure to uranium decay products than in an area where the natural
background of radioactivity in the soil was already subjecting residents
to risks on the order of 10 -4 or higher. In addition to any of the
measures discussed above, therefore, risks could be compared based on
their relative or absolute increment above the background.
Category IL: Dread
* Degree of fear. This is one of the most significant dimensions of
risk, and it varies widely both across individuals within a society and
cross-culturally. Fear can help define what the most important risks are
risks of For example, U.S. citizens tend to regard a lingering death as
more dreadful than a sudden demise. Yet, the opposite is apparently
true in some Asian nations, where the "worst" death is a sudden one
that occurs away from home where one's family and ancestral spirits
cannot help ensure safe passage to the afterlife. Fear can also be an
adverse outcome per se, thereby adding to the graveness of certain risks
that are highly feared.
37 Note that the first risk would rank as 100 times more dire than the second if only
the maximum individual risks were compared, while it would rank one-hundredth as
serious if deaths alone were compared. If the reader believes that the two situations in
fact seem to be of roughly equal severity, then an existing ranking procedure that
could produce two answers that differ in sign and by 10,000-fold in magnitude ought
to seem quite suspect.
38 Frank B. Cross, Daniel M. Byrd III & Lester B. Lave, Discernible Risk - A
Proposed Standardfor Significant Risk in Carcinogen Regulation, 43 Admin. L.Rev.
61(1991).
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* Degree of irreversibility. Irreversibility generally increases the
perceived severity of a risk, whether the continuum from rapid
reversibility to complete irreversibility applies to injury (even major
lacerations are generally seen as less severe than spinal cord injuries),
disease (gastroenteritis versus cancer) or ecological harm (an oil spill
versus a species extinction).
0 Degree of individual controllability. Two risks of equal magnitude
(however that is measured) may elicit strikingly different individual or
social responses if one risk can be avoided or reduced through personal
action and the other cannot (readily or at all). For example, basketball
may be perceived as more hazardous (if injury rates were comparable)
than football, because children cannot realistically compete in the
former sport wearing substantial protective equipment. Similarly, a
carcinogenic contaminant would probably cause more concern if it was
present in milk than in maraschino cherries.
* Degree of deferral to future generations. Individuals may be
strongly affected by the time course of adverse effects. For some, risks
that manifest themselves only in subsequent generations are particularly
dire (because of possible repugnance for making posterity pay); for
others, delayed risks are much less important (because of "discounting"
future costs and the possibility of technological remedies available by
the time effects are manifested) - another striking example of an
attribute (time) being either directly or inversely related to benefit,
depending on individual perception.
Category IIl" Social Context
* Salience of blame. People desire that risks be reduced for various
reasons, some that transcend the direct and tangible benefits to
themselves (e.g., increased life span). One of the most influential of
these intangible factors, in my opinion, is the desire to focus attention
on reducing risks where in so doing injustices can also be redressed.
Scholars have advanced numerous explanations, for instance, why
people generally seem more concerned about the ostensibly smaller
risks from proximity to a hazardous waste disposal site than they are
about the larger risks from radon gas in their homes. While a small part
of the disparity may be explained by the fact that radon is colorless and
odorless, and a larger part by the reality that Superfund cleanups are at
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least perceived to come out of someone else's finances, I suspect that
the most important factor of all is the sense that someone is to blame
for the exposure to waste. The positive action (to dump rather than
reuse or treat) sets in motion the desire for an affirmative counter-
action, a calculus that does not apply in the case of radon.
* Degree of identifiability of those at risk. Much has been written
about our societal propensity to devote much more than proportionate
attention and resources to reducing risks to identifiable victims, be they
three astronauts stuck in the malfunctioning Apollo 13 spacecraft or
three whales trapped in the Alaskan ice pack. A risk that affects a few
readily-identifiable victims (such as some chemical that might
aggravate respiratory symptoms in asthmatics) thus might rate more
concern than another chemical that affects a larger number of persons
seemingly at random from out of the entire population.
* Benefits of the risky activity or exposure. As described in the
previous section, using the example of being hit by a falling airplane
versus contracting cancer from exposure to a pesticide, looking at risk is
at most only half the story. Some risks are more worth taking - or
bearing - than others, and this difference is largely governed by the
perceived benefits that accompany the risk.
a Cost and feasibility of reducing risk. Thus, added to the question
"How large is the risk?" is the concomitant question "Why should we
not wish to reduce it?" The answer depends crucially on what benefits
would be abrogated if the risk was reduced or eliminated. The equation
cannot be complete, however, until we accompany "Should we
reduce?" with "Can we reduce?" Cheaply and easily eliminated, small
risks may deserve priority, whereas in a thorough risk comparison, even
very large risks may not - if reducing them would be technically
infeasible or prohibitively expensive. This dimension is often crucial
because different risks can vary enormously when it comes time to
compare interventions as well as hazards. For example, our perceived
ranking of the need to control handguns in schools would differ
dramatically, I contend, depending on whether metal detectors cost
$100 or $1 million, or if the technology did not exist at all.
* Risks of the intervention itself The two dimensions discussed
immediately above form a nearly-complete accounting of the basic
Finkel: Comparing Risks Thoughtfully 347
reasons for tolerating any risk - if it provides benefits as well as risks,
and if it would be difficult or impossible to eliminate it. There is one
final reason which raises issues of both benefits and cost/feasibility -
the dimension of "offsetting risks," which arises whenever reducing one
risk would create new risks. One can therefore look at any "primary
risk" in a new light - that part of its accompanying benefit is freeing us
from some other risk, or alternatively, that its elimination might be
costly in units of risk as well as dollars. There are many ways in which
risk reductions can themselves be risky. Graham and Wiener develop a
typology that categorizes both the type of risk created (similar to or
different from the primary risk) and the population affected (the same
as or different from those affected by the primary risk).3 9 For
example, expelling violent students might transfer a similar risk from
one population (in-school victims) to another (members of the local
community). Or, eliminating the chlorination of water to reduce
possible cancer risks in schools might create a new risk (from pathogens
that survive less effective means of disinfection) among the same
population. In any case, the implicit ranking given to the primary risk
might well be strongly influenced by the "risk consequences" of the
feasible ways of addressing it.
Social and Informational Processes for Comparing Risks
We compare risks - at least, the reason we ought to - to help
guide our actions. We need a way to implement the three theorems
presented above (or some superior conceptual framework for comparing
risks) so that the affected stakeholders can reach a consensual
determination about which risks are most worthy of attention.
Whatever process society chooses for putting comparative risk
assessment into practice, it ought to advance two distinct goals in turn.
(1) Provide a forum for identifying, and making
judgments about, the "important" dimensions of the risks
being compared. As a practical matter, the process should
therefore move the debate over which risks are "worst"
beyond the current "tunnel vision" that only considers point
estimates of consequences, and yet not lurch so far towards
an ornate characterization of each risk that the debate
39 Risk Versus Risk. Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (John D.
Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, eds. 1995).
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becomes unmanageably complex and divorced from any
consideration of quantitative risk information.
(2) Provide a framework for asking, and moving towards
consensus about, the real underlying question: "What
should we do to make our lives safer and do less damage to
the environment, given that any intervention we undertake
will use up resources from a finite suppl.y?". This is the
question that elevates CRA from a fascinating but
ultimately futile endeavor (of deciding what is most worth
worrying about) to a complete and practical activity of
deciding what we should do, given what we can do and
what it costs to do it.
The remainder of this article will discuss two related process issues:
How to structure the public debate over setting priorities to reduce
risks; and what information analysts should transmit to the involved
parties to initiate or inform such debate.
Considerations of Social Process
Most of my insights into what kind of process might be optimal for
coming to public judgment about the relative risks of various hazards
are drawn from a 1992 Center for Risk Management conference
entitled "Setting National Environmental Priorities: The EPA Risk-
Based Paradigm and its Alternatives." 40 It dealt exclusively with
"large" CRA, and even more specifically with the intent of then-
Administrator William Reilly to reorient EPA's budget with the goal of
"reducing the worst risks first." However, the discussions about the
possible processes for judging what to do first are, I think, broadly
applicable to "small" CRA as well.4 1
Much discussion at the conference centered around the distinctions
between the so-called "hard" version of risk-based priority setting
championed by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (and,
according to some, EPA as well) and the "soft" version preferred by
some other stakeholders. Many believe that the "hard" version - in
which a small group of experts estimate the magnitude of various risks
and marginal costs of reduction to yield a numerical ranking of risk
40 Worst Things First? The Debate over Risk-Based National Environmental
Priorities (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding, eds. 1994).
41 The 1992 conference was not intended to enerate consensus among the 100-plus
participants, so any of the opinions paraphraseclhere are merely ideas that some of the
attendees put forth or endorsed.
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reduction opportunities in order of "bang for the buck" - can do more
harm than good. Certainly, this article suggests that confining the
ranking process to "experts," and further circumscribing it to deal only
in the currency of "risk numbers," will not be productive in advancing
social judgments on risks for two overriding reasons: (1) The conceptual
ranking tool used is one-dimensional when many other dimensions may
be of equal or greater "importance" than risk magnitude alone; (2) even
if magnitude is the most important dimension, the dynamic of
monologue rather than dialogue to determine the ranking will tend to
foment resentment and mistrust among the affected citizens.
The "soft" version is no panacea, however. In this paradigm, a
representative group composed of citizens and "experts" would work
together to generate a more "impressionistic" ranking out of a
consensual weighting of the various dimensions that distinguish the
risks under consideration. The obvious objection to the "softening" of
CRA is that it allows people to make "soft" dimensions as important as,
or more important than, the quantitative information about how to
reduce risks most significantly with the resources we have - in essence,
the "soft" version may just be a polite way to describe the overly
emotional, haphazard, inefficient way we now set priorities. A perhaps
less obvious, but potentially more damaging criticism was raised by
Donald Hornstein at the 1992 conference. 42 Hornstein and others
have pointed out an irony - that the "soft" version is held up as an
alternative to the technocratic elitism of the "hard" approach. Yet, it
may be no less vulnerable to being dominated by special interests. A
system that purports to examine risks holistically will fail to live up to
that noble aim if in practice the appointed ranking group (or a powerful
subset thereof) successfully redefines risk as "fear" or "inequity" or
"outrage" or some other dimension that may be just as sterile in its own
way as "magnitude" alone.
Thus, besides the challenges facing us to improve the way we
characterize risks, we have yet to put forward a means of aggregating
and reconciling the unique ways each citizen will choose to process that
information to arrive at a comparative risk ranking. Those who wish to
42 Paradigms, Process, and Politics: Risk and Regulatory Design, in Worst Things
First? supra note 40, at 152.
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advance the debate over whether and how we should change the way we
manage risks need to be mindful that better information alone will not
improve whatever suboptimal priorities we have - without a better
mechanism for translating that information into conclusions all parties
can accept (or at least can live with).
Considerations of Information
Regardless of whether comparative risk information eventually is
transmitted to "experts," a group of laypeople intended to represent the
broader public, or even the whole citizenry (perhaps as a prelude to a
referendum), I contend that the subsequent process is more likely to
yield both reasonable and publicly-acceptable outputs if four precepts
regarding the type of information proffered are considered.
(1) Tailor the level of detail (e.g., the number of dimensions
discussed) to the purpose of the comparison: More important
comparisons deserve more detailed information. The concept of
"iteration" - moving beyond a "one size fits all" approach to risk
assessment by matching the ambitiousness of the assessment to the
needs of the consumers - may be taking hold as a principle for the
future of the field. 43 Iteration applied to risk comparisons would mean
that when the decision is straightforward enough or sufficiently routine
that a "back of the envelope" characterization will suffice, an exhaustive
and ornate comparison would be wasteful. Conversely, for complex and
socially important decisions, the richness of the comparison should
reflect its intended use. A potential example of a risk comparison where
a less detailed set of information might well suffice is that of whether to
equip school buses with seat belts; here, the influence of dread and
social-context attributes may be minor enough that a "harder"
quantification might tell most of the story. On the other hand,
deciding whether to embark on either an ambitious program of asbestos
mitigation in schools or to devote the same resources to violence
reduction programs in schools is such a weighty and value-laden choice
that the more dimensions analyzed and discussed with the
stakeholders, the better. Other things being equal, I believe it is also
important to follow the principle that the more the authors of a
comparison intend it to convince rather than merely inform recipients,
43 See Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 23.
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the more detailed and multi-dimensional the comparison should be. It
should require less care to inform people that they can rationally judge
either of two risks to be more dire than to lead them towards a
conclusion, however well-grounded, that one or another risk is worse.
(2) Express risks both as population consequences and as individual
probabilities; highlight the uncertainty in the former and the variability
in the latter. There is still a vigorous debate about how to fully
characterize uncertainty and variability in any given risk assessment.4 4
Also, of course, even knowing how to do it exhaustively would not solve
the practical problem of how to manage the tension between
completeness and comprehensibility. As we move towards a better
understanding of the twin phenomena of uncertainty and variability, I
would suggest a rough schema for reporting risk estimates (the
"magnitude" dimension of risk comparisons). For "detailed"
comparisons (see the discussion of "iteration" above), this scheme
would replace the single number currently used (Risk A is X times as
big as Risk B) with a manageable alternative set of six numbers:
0 The lower and upper bounds4 5 on R, the ratio of one
population-wide risk to the other. So, comparison of the
consequences of two risks would take the form "Risk A
causes betwedn ten and 100 times more fatalities annually
than Risk B" or "with 95% confidence, all we can say is that
A causes somewhere between ten times more than and half
as many fatalities as B" (see Appendix A).
* The lower and upper bounds on the individual risk
posed by Risk A and by Risk B (i.e., four more numbers, for
a total of six), accounting for inter-individual variations in
such risk. At a minimum, this range will allow individuals
with differing attitudes towards risk to see the full panoply
of possibilities they might face and judge their prospects
accordingly. Much more helpful if the information is
obtainable, though, would be to supplement the bounds
with information on what distinguishing characteristics of
individuals correspond to each of the bounds. For example,
the probability of being a victim of some type of violence
might range from 10-6 (in some particular rural community)
44 Id.
45 These bounds should probably be the statisticians' standard 5th and 95th
percentiles, or a slightly more inclusive or less inclusive pair (e.g., the 10th and 90th),
rather than more extreme combinations such as the quartiles (25th and 75th) or the
1st and 99th.
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to 10-3 (in the center of some troubled urban area). Giving
both the numbers and their geographical correlates would be
far more informative than simply communicating the
numbers above. Or (to give an example with a continuous
correlate), the cancer risk from some pesticide in food
might also range from 10-6 to 10-3 because the intrinsic risk
was 10-6 per gram of the food consumed per day (and
because 5% of the population eats one kilogram of the
foodstuff per day). Both examples illustrate what I believe is
an absolutely critical concept in risk communication:
Citizens care about the risks to themselves or to other "real
people," not a hypothetical average or worst-case person. If
analysts can help people narrow down the risk range to a
meaningful estimate specific to their unique circumstances,
then they will have truly engaged in "risk communication. "
(3) Compare actions, not disembodied risks. Setting priorities is
more than simply ranking risks. As many have remarked,4 6 to set
priorities means to guide where resources should flow; while the
"biggest" problems may be mental priorities, they may bear no
resemblance to functional priorities. Large risks may have no feasible,
economical or politically acceptable means of control or prevention,
while small risks may be eliminated through actions that carry a small
or even a negative economic price. Therefore, even if none of the
psychosocial and contextual dimensions of risk are to be included in the
analyst's attempt at risk comparison, decision-makers and stakeholders
need information on the costs and feasibilities of specific interventions
to judge where resources should flow. These estimates may be as
uncertain as the risk estimates are, and may add further complexity to
the social process, but the alternative is either to rank the risks alone and
have no guide for policy, or (perhaps worse) for decision makers to
assume that the risk ranking equals the resource allocation.
(4) Regard the initial information that flows from the analyst to
the decision-maker or to the populace as just that - initial In
addition to having a central role to play in evaluating the empirical and
narrative information about the various dimensions of the risks being
compared, the stakeholders also may have much to contribute in
structuring and supplementing the information itself. Depending on
46 See, e.g., Dale Hattis & Robert L. Goble, Current Priotity-Setting
Methodology: Too Little Rationality or Too Much? in Worst Things First? supra
note 40.
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the circumstances, the "consumers" of comparative risk information
may wish to see other dimensions analyzed - or may even want to
consider other risks (or to aggregate the given set of risks into different
categories). Their most far-reaching role might well be to impel the
comparison of risk reduction interventions not initially considered. For
example, EPA's "large" risk comparison effort has been criticized for
only trying to move society "out of the fire and into the frying pan."4 7
Hornstein claims that in comparing, among many other examples, the
cost-effectiveness of reducing air pollution risks by shifting from fossil
fuels to nuclear power (versus the increase in safety hazards and other
risks that the shift might achieve), EPA has discouraged society from
asking the larger question: Can we reduce demand for both sources of
electricity simultaneously, or shift to a power source that is superior in
terms of both emissions and safety?
Similarly, some criticize "zero-sum" choices inherent in
government's declaring it can address only one risk or another.
4 8
While current agency budgets might be sufficiently tight that
expenditures on one risk must crowd out efforts on another, the "first-
best" solution might well be to redefine the boundaries of the problem
and see if other governmental or societal expenditures are even less
efficient than either of the two competing interventions. In other words,
one response to the assertion that we need to spend less on Superfund
cleanups to furnish smoke detectors to all public housing units (a shift
that would almost certainty save more "statistical lives") is that there are
many other "pockets" from which the smaller expenditure for smoke
detectors could be drawn. It is very important that in many cases a
more thorough examination of such purported "win/win situations"
might reveal that there is in fact "no free lunch." Yet, I expect that the
question needs to be asked more frequently and that stakeholders will
view it with greater trust if risks are not automatically played off against
one another. At the end, we compare risks to reduce them - not to
fool ourselves that such reductions are painless or to cringe before the
opportunities to make our lives safer and healthier.
47 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum. L.Rev. 562, 626 (1992).
48 See, e.g., Mary O'Brien, A Proposal to Address, Rather Than Rank
Environmental Problems, in Worst Things First? supra note 40.
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Appendix A
The Mathematics and Logic of Comparing Uncertain Risks
Uncertain quantities, including individual or population risk
estimates, can be summarized via any of several "estimators" or
"summary statistics." The most well-known of these are the median
(the 50th percentile), the mean (also known as the expected value), and
some upper confidence limit such as the 95th or 99th percentile. These
summary statistics are very important in compactly conveying
information in a form readily accessible to decision-makers and the
public. When comparing two uncertain risks, however, any of these
summaries can give a misleading picture of the relative size of the risks;
in fact, no estimator alone is sufficient even to determine qualitatively
which risk is larger and which is smaller. Moreover, the highly-touted
"best estimates" (usually either the median or mean) are no better than
any other single measure at avoiding highly misleading results, despite
connotations of the adjective "best" and the tendency of many CRA
practitioners to use these measures to make facile comparisons while
criticizing all other measures as "value-laden." The following example
shows how misleading summary statistics can be, and suggests ways to
communicate the complexity inherent in correctly comparing risks.
Consider two substances which can both cause cancer in humans;
assume further that in a nation of ten million inhabitants, each person is
exposed to the same amount of each substance. The only uncertainty in
individual or population risk is thus due to our lack of knowledge of the
exact potency of either substance. 49
Suppose our "best estimate" of the potency of Substance A is such
that it would pose an excess individual risk of 5 x 10- 5 (i.e., one excess
death per 20,000 persons exposed over a lifetime, or 500 excess deaths
in the hypothetical country every 70 years). However, suppose scientists
are sufficiently uncertain about A's potency that they believe there is a
5% chance it is about 5.2 times more potent than its "best estimate"
and a corresponding 5% chance it is 1/5.2 times as potent.50
49 For brevity, I present only this one example. The mathematics would be
unchanged if I replaced all the sources of uncertainty with sources of inter-individual
variability, although the social implications of the results might not be. I encourage the
reader to re-read this example as if all the imprecision was due to differences among
individuals rather than to scientific uncertainty.
50 This "uncertainty factor" of 5.2 is arguably quite small compared to many
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Now suppose our "best estimate" of the potency of Substance B is
that it is one fifth as large as that of A; in other words, we believe the
individual risk from B is 1 x 10-5 (or 100 excess deaths every 70 years).
We know a bit less about B than we know about A; it could be 29 times
more than or 1/29th as potent as we think (again, each alternative has a
5% chance of being correct).
Let us look at four different ways to compare the two risks, each
based on a different summary measure, to see how difficult it can be to
choose the "right" way to compare them:
(1) Comparing the two "best estimates" leads us to believe
that A is five times riskier than B, as seen above (500 versus
100 deaths).
(2) But consider another type of "best estimate." Rather
than the median used above, we could use the mean, which
is the sum of all possible values of risk weighed by their
probabilities. 5 1 I have constructed this example such that,
judged via their means, the two risks are exactly equal (both
8.24 x 10-5 on an individual-risk basis, or 824 excess deaths
expected in the whole population). Here, each mean value is
higher than its median because of the fact that the chance
we ve underestimated the risk by X-fold has more of an
effect on the estimate than the equal chance we've
overestimated it by X-fold - just as in the note below,
where the people who earn $500,000 are "richer than
average" by a larger amount than people who earn $5,000
are "poorer than average."
(3) Suppose you were particularly concerned about the
reasonable worst-case" values of each risk. Here B is more
uncertain than A, and in fact B is riskier than A by the
criterion of the respective 95th percentile estimates (there is
a 5% chance the risk of A is 2.6 x 10-4 or greater, while for
B the corresponding estimate is 2.9 x 10-4).
imprecisions that characterize actual cancer risk assessments. For purists, this factor is
actually a logarithmic standard deviation of 1.0 from an underlying lognormal
distribution whose median equals the "best estimate."
51 The median is an average that doesn't account for how far away from the center
any other value is; each measurement (or person) counts equally. In a group where ten
people have annual incomes of $5,000, 80 earn $50,000, and ten earn $500,000, the
median is $50,000 because as many people earn this amount or more as earn less. The
mean, however, would be [10(5000) + 80(50,000) + 10(500,000)] + 100, or $90,500.
Both measures are informative in a different way. The former is akin to looking for an
"average person" and then asking her what she earns; the latter is more of a best guess
of what a random person would earn, or what the population on average earns. In a
lognormal distribution, the mean exceeds the median by a multiplicative factor of
exp(O.5 G2), where a is the logarithmic standard deviation.
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(4) By the 95th percentile criterion, B is admittedly not
substantially worse than A. But why consider only the 95th
percentile? Suppose you wanted to know how high each risk
might be and still have a one in 100 chance of being even
higher. By this 99th percentile criterion, B (whose 99th
percentile estimate is 1.2 x 10-3) is more than twice as risky
as A (which is equally unlikely to be higher than 5.2 x 10-4).
The more concerned you were about incorrectly
underestimating either risk, the riskier B looks.
Consider these four comparisons in tabular form:
Estimator Risk A Risk B Ratio A/B
Median 5 x 10-5  1 x 10- 5  5:1
Mean 8.24 x 10-5  8.24 x 10- 5  1:1
95th percentile 2.6 x 10-4  2.9 x 10-4  (1:1.1)
99th percentile 5.2 x 10 -4  1.2 x 10-3  (1:2.3)
As this indicates, depending on which summary statistic you use,
the two risks can appear to be equal, in one rank order, or in the
opposite rank order.
Since we cannot determine confidently which risk is larger, how can
this ambiguity be conveyed informatively? After all, there is a
substantial difference between "we cannot tell which risk is larger" and
"we know that the two risks are equal." The former situation applies
here, not the latter.
One promising way to attack this problem is to focus not on the
uncertainty in the absolute magnitude of either risk, but on the
uncertainty in the ratio of one risk divided by the other. In this
hypothetical case, the quantity (B + A) is distributed normally (a "bell-
shaped curve") on a multiplicative scale. To be precise, the center of this
distribution lies at the point 0.2 (that is, A is five times larger than B, as
the two median estimates in the table indicate), but the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the ratio are a factor of 42.8 away from the center. In
other words, A could be 214 (5 x 42.8) times greater than B, but with
equal probability B could be 8.6 (1/5 x 42.8) times greater than A. 52
52 Note that the 95th percentile of the ratio (B/A = 8.6) does not equal the value in
the third column of the table (B/A = 1.1), which is the quotient of the two 95th
percentile values of each risk viewed separately. This again shows how only comparing
separate summary statistics can give misleading results.
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One can also examine this ratio uncertainty to find the point on the
distribution where the two risks are equal; in this case, there is about a
75% chance that A > B, not an unexpected result since at the center of
the distribution A is five times larger than B.
Now we come to a crossroads. The single number as an answer can
lead one headlong into a wrong decision. Yet, compared to the more
cumbersome analysis and communication of the uncertainty in the
ratio, at least it is clear and comprehensible. While the subject of
"rational" decision-making under uncertainty is a complex and
controversial one, let me suggest three paradigm situations where the
more thorough kind of comparison advocated here can be both
efficient and informative. Together, these situations cover most if not
all of the real cases decision-makers and citizens will encounter when
risks must be compared.
Case 1: One risk is clearly larger than the other over most or all of
the ratio distribution. This situation will occur either when the central
estimates diverge wildly or when the uncertainties are very small (or
both, of course). Here the "right way" to do the comparison yields the
same answer as the facile way, but the former is more informative and
more credible or trust-engendering. To say "Risk C is five times larger
than Risk D" is only slightly more compact than to say "we are 99%
sure Risk C is between three and ten times larger than Risk D," and the
latter statement avoids conveying a false sense of precision.
Case 2: The "noise" in the comparison (far) outweighs any "signal"
of relative risk. This paradigm situation is more common than many
"experts" in CRA realize. For example, I have argued 53 that the oft-
quoted result that "aflatoxin is eighteen times riskier than Alar" was
doubly misleading because the central estimate of the ratio was much
closer to 1:1, and, much more importantly, because the uncertainty
spanned four orders of magnitude, such that either risk could well have
been ten to 100 times larger than the other. Here the superiority of the
more thorough approach to CRA is most obvious. To say "Either risk
might be much larger than the other, but we can't tell which one" is not
at all an admission of defeat - it is equivalent to saying "We've looked
for the keys under the lamppost and haven't found them there."
53 Finkel, supra note 22.
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It puts a stop to a fruitless search and impels us to look elsewhere.
That "elsewhere" may be to improve the data on exposure or the
scientific basis of the toxicity information, so that in the future we can
pick the "signal" out of the "noise." Or, it may be to declare that we
cannot resolve the comparison via the single dimension of statistical
magnitude and must therefore look to other ways in which the two
risks may well differ more meaningfully and definitively.
Case 3: There is both "signal" and "noise" to reckon with. Here is
where the real discipline and craft of risk management must come to
the fore. When one risk is not unambiguously larger than the other, and
yet a choice must be made, any choice may turn out incorrect. Risk
management is about balancing the probabilities and consequences of
such errors. For example, in the hypothetical above, how can one cope
with the reality that Risk A appears to be five times larger than Risk B,
but it could well be 214 times larger or B could be 8.6 times larger than
A? The path of greatest promise requires three questions to be asked:
- What is the probability of each error? If the practical
choice involved banning either Substance A or B (or,
equivalently, creating a risk of B in the act of eliminating
Risk A), then the decision problem above would reduce to
this 2 x 2 "consequence table" (note: "A>B" means "A is
truly riskier than B"):
Reality Action
Ban.A Ban B
A>B good choice poor choice
B>A poor choice good choice
The first step in enhancing those qualitative descriptions
with more tangible consequences is to assign probabilities to
each of the two horizontal rows (the axis over which the
decision-maker has no control). Here, the probabilities
would be about 75% and 25%, respectively (see above).
* Which of the possible adverse consequences is less
tolerable? In this example, A is more likely to be the larger
risk, and it is also more likely that A is much larger than B
than vice versa (214 > 8.6). Thus, the "poor choice" in the
lower-left corner of the table seems both less likely and less
adverse than the "poor choice" in the upper-right corner. In
other words, going after A seems sensible because the
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consequences of failure (a combination of probability and
magnitude) are smaller than they would be if B were
addressed instead. However, there are many reasons why a
decision-maker might be especially desirous of avoiding
certain errors, even if they are less likely and/or less severe
(as measured by numbers alone) than other errors. For
example, if Substance A was naturally-occurring and B was
deliberately added to foods, it might be "rational" to
consider precluding a "lower-left" error (allowing the
synthetic substance when in fact it is somewhat riskier than
the alternative) even though the other mistake (allowing the
natural substance when in fact it is much riskier) would have
larger "expected consequences." The bottom line of this
weighing of likelihoods and consequences in these difficult
"Case 3" situations is vexing: When both a "signal" of
relative risk and "noise" are present, one may need to pay
less attention to the signal if contained within the noise is a
particular unwelcome consequence.
- (How) can I improve my prospects? The final, and
perhaps least-appreciated question when faced with choosing
among different errors is whether the choice has to be so
grim. Sometimes, creative interventions can have a higher
expected value and a lower risk of a highly adverse mistake
than either (any) of the obvious choices contained in a
simplified "consequences table." For example, one might be
able to reduce exposures to both Substance A and B without
eliminating either one completely. Or, often in the shorter-
term, one can reduce the uncertainties without first choosing
which risk to reduce. If the consequences of deferring the
control choice while the research (uncertainty reduction)
proceeds are less onerous than facing an immediate choice
would be, the prospects for reducing the "noise" and
effectively transforming a Case 3 into a Case 1 may be the
most attractive contingency of all. Not all choices can be
made less difficult, of course, but (to return one final time
to the "lamppost" metaphor) it is almost always worth
thinking whether there might be a spare set of keys available
to you, rather than continuing to agonize over whether to
search either under the lamppost or in the dark.
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